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Nonclassical truth with classical strength.
A proof-theoretic analysis of compositional truth over hype.
Martin Fischer, Carlo Nicolai, and Pablo Dopico Fernandez
Abstract. Questions concerning the proof-theoretic strength of classical versus non-classical
theories of truth have received some attention recently. A particularly convenient case study
concerns classical and nonclassical axiomatizations of fixed-point semantics. It is known that
nonclassical axiomatizations in four- or three-valued logics are substantially weaker than their
classical counterparts. In this paper we consider the addition of a suitable conditional to
First-Degree Entailment – a logic recently studied by Hannes Leitgeb under the label ‘hype’.
We show in particular that, by formulating the theory pkf over hype, one obtains a theory
that is sound with respect to fixed-point models, while being proof-theoretically on a par with
its classical counterpart kf. Moreover, we establish that also its schematic extension – in the
sense of Feferman – is as strong as the schematic extension of kf, thus matching the strength
of predicative analysis.
1. Introduction
The question whether there are non-classical formal systems of primitive truth that can achieve
significant proof-theoretic strength has received much attention in the recent literature. Solomon
Feferman [Fef84] famously claimed that ‘nothing like sustained ordinary reasoning can be carried
out’ in the standard non-classical systems that support strong forms of inter-substitutivity of A
and ‘A is true’ that are sufficient to generate paradoxical phenomena together with classical logic.
One way of understanding this claim is by measuring how much mathematics can be encoded
in such systems. Since the strength of mathematical systems (whether classical or non-classical)
is traditionally measured in terms of the ordinals that can be well-ordered by them, the ordinal
analysis of non-classical systems of truth becomes relevant.
We are mainly interested in the proof-theoretic analysis of non-classical systems inspired by
fixed-point semantics [Kri75]. Since fixed-point semantics has nice axiomatizations, both clas-
sical and non-classical, it represents a particularly convenient arena to measure the impact of
weakening the logic on proof-theoretic strength. The axiomatization of fixed-point semantics in
classical logic – a.k.a. KF – is known to have the proof-theoretic ordinal ϕε00 [Fef91,Can89],
1
Halbach and Horsten have proposed in [HH06] a non-classical axiomatization, known as PKF,
and showed that it has proof-theoretic ordinal ϕω0. There have been some attempts to overcome
this mismatch in strength on the non-classical side. [Nic17] showed that even without expanding
1Or Γ0, depending on whether one focuses on a version of the theory with or without suitable open-ended
substitution rule schemata.
1
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the logical resources of theory, PKF can be extended with suitable instances of transfinite induc-
tion to recover all classical true theorems of KF. [FHN17] show that a simple theory featuring
non-classical initial sequents of the form A⇒ TrpAq and TrpAq⇒ A can be closed under special
reflection principles to recover the arithmetical strength of PKF and KF. More recently, [Fie20]
has shown that, by enlarging the primitive concepts of PKF with a predicate for ‘classicality’,
one can achieve the proof-theoretic strength of KF in both the schematic and non-schematic
versions.
In the paper we explore a different option, which in a sense completes the picture above. We
enlarge the standard four-valued logic of PKF with a new conditional, which is based on the
logic HYPE recently proposed by [Lei19]. The conditional has several features that resemble an
intuitionistic conditional, but its weaker interaction with the FDE -negation makes it possible to
sustain the intersubstitutivity of A and ‘A is true’ for sentences not containing the conditional.
This extended theory, that we call KFL, is shown to be proof-theoretically equivalent with KF.
Its extension with a schematic substitution rule, called KFL∗, is shown to be proof-theoretically
equivalent to the schematic extension of KF – called Ref∗(PA(P )) in [Fef91].
In particular, we show that the conditional proper of the logic HYPE enables one to mimic,
when carefully handled, the standard lower bound proofs by Gentzen and Feferman-Schütte for
transfinite induction in classical arithmetic (Theorem 1) and predicative analysis (Proposition
4), respectively. This enables us to define, in our theories KFL and KFL∗, ramified truth
predicates indexed by ordinals smaller than ε0 (Corollary 5) and Γ0 (Corollary 7). Moreover, the
proof-theoretic analysis of KFL and KFL∗ is completed by showing that their truth predicates
can be suitably interpreted in their classical counterparts KF and Ref∗(PA(P )) without altering
the arithmetical vocabulary (Propositions 2 and 5).
2. HYPE
In this section we will present the logical basis of our systems of truth. We will work with a
sequent calculus variant of the logic HYPE introduced by Leitgeb in [Lei19]. Essentially, the
calculus is obtained by extending First-Degree Entailment with an intuitionistic conditional and
rules for it in a multi-conclusion style.
2.1. G1hcd. We present a multiconclusion system based on a multi-conclusion calculus for in-
tuitionistic logic:2 we call it G1hcd for Gentzen system for the logic HYPE with constant
domains. Sequents are understood as multisets. We work with a language whose logical symbols
are ¬, ∨ , →, ∀, ⊥. For Γ = γ1, . . . , γn a multiset, ¬Γ is the multiset ¬γ1, . . . ,¬γn. ∧, ∃ can
be defined as usual and ⊤ is defined as ¬⊥. Moreover, we can define ‘intuitionistic’ negation
∼ A as A→ ⊥, the material conditional A ⊃ B as ¬A ∨B, and material equivalence A ≡ B as
(A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ A).
2This system goes back to Maehara’s version used in Takeuti [Tak87] p.52f and Dragalin’s system used in Negri
and Plato [NP01] p.108f.
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The system G1hcd consists of the following initial sequents and rules:
(IDp) A⇒ A (L⊥) ⊥ ⇒ .
Γ⇒ ∆, A A,Γ⇒ ∆
(Cut)
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆(LW)
A,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆(RW)
Γ⇒ ∆, A
A,A,Γ⇒ ∆
(LC)
A,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, A,A
(RC)
Γ⇒ ∆, A
A,Γ⇒ ∆ B,Γ⇒ ∆
(L∨)
A ∨B,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ A,B,∆
(R∨)
Γ⇒ A ∨B,∆
Γ⇒ ∆, A B,Γ⇒ ∆
(L→)
A→ B,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ, A⇒ B
(R→)
Γ⇒ A→ B,∆
Γ⇒ ¬∆(ConCp)
∆⇒ ¬Γ
¬Γ⇒ ∆(ClCp)
¬∆⇒ Γ
A(t),Γ⇒ ∆
(L∀ )
∀xA,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, A(y)
(R∀) y /∈ FV (Γ,∆, ∀xA)
Γ⇒ ∆, ∀xA
We write rk(A) for the logical complexity of A, defined as the number of nodes in the longest
branch of its syntactic tree. For a derivation d we let
• hgt(d) := supi<n{hgt(di) + 1 | di an immediate subderivation of d} (the height of the
derivation), where d0, ..., dn are the immediate subderivations of d (the cut-rank of d).
On occasion, we write ⊢n Γ⇒ ∆ for ‘there exists a derivation d of Γ⇒ ∆ with hgt(d) ≤ n’.
The next lemma collects some basic facts about G1hcd.
Lemma 1.
(i) The sequents ⇒ ⊤, A⇒ ¬¬A, ¬¬A⇒ A, are derivable in G1hcd.
(ii) The rule of contraposition
Γ⇒ ∆
¬∆⇒ ¬Γ
is admissible in G1hcd
(iii) The following rules are admissible in G1hcd:
A,B,Γ⇒ ∆
(L∧)
A ∧B,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ A,∆ Γ⇒ B,∆
(R∧)
Γ⇒ A ∧B,∆
A(y),Γ⇒ ∆
(L∃) y /∈ FV(Γ,∆, ∃xA)
∃xA,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, A(t)
(R∃)
Γ⇒ ∆, ∃xA
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(iv) Intersubstitutivity: If χ ⇒ χ′ and χ′ ⇒ χ, as well as ψ are derivable in G1hcd, then
ψ(χ′/χ) is derivable, where ψ(χ′/χ) is obtained by replacing all occurrences of χ in ψ by
χ′.
We opted for this specific formulation of G1hcd mainly for reasons of simplicity. From a
proof-theoretic point of view, the calculus has some drawbacks even at the propositional level,
as the rules ConCp and ClCp compromise the induction needed for cut-elimination. This problem
could be solved, in the propositional case, by splitting the contraposition rule on a case by
case manner [Fis20]. However, when one moves to the quantificational system, there are deeper
problems. The same counterexample that is employed to show that cut is not admissible in
systems of intuitionistic logic with constant domains can be employed for the systems we are
investigating.3 Therefore, since cut elimination is beyond reach anyway for constant domains
quantificational rules, we opt for a more compact presentation of G1hcd that fits nicely our
purpose of extending it with arithmetic and truth rules.
2.2. Equality. G1hcd can be extended with a theory of equality. G1h
=
cd is obtained by adding
to G1hcd the following initial sequents for equality.
⇒ t = t(Ref)
s = t, A(s)⇒ A(t)(Rep)
In G1h=cd, given ConCp, we can recover the classical principles for identity statements.
Lemma 2. ⇒ s = t,¬s = t and s = t,¬s = t⇒ are derivable.
Proof. We use the identity sequents:
s = t,¬s = t⇒ ¬t = t
⇒ t = t
¬t = t⇒
s = t,¬s = t⇒
⇒ ¬s = t,¬¬s = t
⇒ ¬s = t, s = t

Lemma 2 reveals some subtle issues concerning the treatment of identity in subclassical logics
generally employed to deal with semantical paradoxes. It tells us that identity is essentially
treated as a classical notion in G1h=cd. To obtain a similar phenomenon in absence of ConCp and
ClCp, one would have to add the counterpositives of Rep and Ref to the system. A non-classical
treatment for identity would require some non-trivial changes to Rep and Ref. That identity is
a classical notion is perfectly in line with our framework, in which identity is a non-semantic
notion akin to mathematical notions.
3See for example López-Escobar [LE83].
Nonclassical truth with classical strength. 5
2.3. Semantics. In this section we present the semantics of G1hcd (and therefore of HYPE)
and sketch its completeness with respect to it. We follow a simplification of the semantics in
Leitgeb [Lei19] suggested by Speranski [Spe20]. Speranski connects the HYPE-models with
Routley semantics. A Routley frame F is a triple 〈W,≤, ∗〉, where:
(1) W is a non-empty set (we can think of them as states);
(2) ≤ is a preorder;
(3) ∗ is a function from W to W , which is:
(a) antimonotone, i.e. for all w, v ∈W , if w ≤ v, then v∗ ≤ w∗;
(b) involutive, i.e. for all w ∈W , w∗∗ = w.
A constant domain model M for HYPE is a triple (F, D, I) where: F is a Routley frame, D is
a non-empty set (the domain of the model), and I is an interpretation function. In particular,
I assigns to every constant c an element of D and it associates with each state w and n-place
predicate P a set Pw ⊆ Dn. The constants are then interpreted rigidly and, although domains
do not grow, we impose the following hereditariness condition: for all v, w ∈ W , if v ≤ w, then
for all predicates P , P v ⊆ Pw.
Let M be a constant domain model, w ∈ W and σ : VAR → D a variable assignment on D,
then the forcing relation M, w, σ  A is defined inductively:
M, w, σ  P (x1, ..., xn) iff (σ(x1), ..., σ(xn)) ∈ P
w;
M, w, σ  ¬A iff M, w∗, σ 1 A;
M, w, σ  A ∨B iff M, w, σ  A or M, w, σ  B;
M, w, σ  A→ B iff for all v, with w ≤ v, if M, v, σ  A, then M, v, σ  B;
M, w, σ  ∀xA iff for all x-variants σ′ of σ,M, w, σ′  A;
M, w, σ  ⊤ and M, w, σ 1 ⊥.
Finally, we define logical consequence. We write, for Γ,∆ sets of sentences:
• M, w  Γ⇒ ∆ iff: if M, w  γ for all γ ∈ Γ, then M, w  δ for some δ ∈ ∆;
• Γ  ∆ iff for all M, w: M, w  Γ⇒ ∆.
G1hcd is equivalent to the following Hilbert-style system QN
◦ featuring the axiom schemata:
A→ (B → C) A→ (B → C)→ ((A→ B)→ (B → C))
A ∧B → A A ∧B → B
A→ A ∨B B → A ∨B
A→ (B → A ∧B) (A→ C)→ ((B → C)→ (A ∨B → C))
¬¬A→ A A→ ¬¬A
∀xA→ A(t) A(t)→ ∃xA
and the following rules of inference:
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A A→ B (MP)
B
A→ B (CP)
¬B → ¬A
A→ B(x)
x not free in A
A→ ∀xB
A(x)→ B
x not free in B
∃xA→ B
Our system G1hcd is equivalent to QN
◦. We know in fact that all the axioms of QN◦ except
for the double negation axioms are intuitionistically valid. So with our Lemma 1 we can derive
all the axioms of QN◦ as well as the admissibility of contraposition. Rules for quantifiers are
easily established in G1hcd. For the other direction a proof on the length of the derivations is
sufficient and the fact that in QN◦ the deduction theorem holds simplifies the proof. Therefore,
we have:
Lemma 3. G1hcd ⊢ Γ⇒ ∆ iff QN
◦ ⊢
∧
Γ→
∨
∆.
Speranski [Spe20] establishes a strong completeness result (for countable signatures) for QN◦.
Speranski uses a Henkin-style proof similar to the strategy employed in Gabbay et al. [GSS09,
§7.2] for intuitionistic logic with constant domains. Leitgeb [Lei19] establishes a (weak) com-
pleteness proof for his Hilbert style system based on the work of Görnemann [Gör71]. By Lemma
3 we can employ Speranski’s completeness result for our system G1hcd with respect to Routley
semantics:
Proposition 1 (Completeness of G1hcd [Spe20]). Γ  ∆ iff there is a finite ∆0 ⊆ ∆, such that
Γ ⊢QN◦ ∆0.
2.4. HYPE and recapture. One of the desirable properties of the non-classical logics employed
in the debate on semantic paradoxes is the capability of recapturing classical reasoning in domains
where there is no risk of paradoxicality, such as mathematics – see e.g. [Fie08].4
The following lemma summarizes the recapture properties ofG1hcd and extensions thereof. It
essentially states that, in systems based on G1hcd, once we restrict our attention to a fragment
of the language satisfying the excluded middle and/or explosion, the native HYPE-negation
and conditional, as well as the defined intuitionistic negation, all behave fully classically.
Lemma 4.
4This form of recapture is a slightly different phenomenon than a direct, provability preserving, translation of the
entire language of one theory in the other, as it happens for instance in the famous Gödel-Gentzen translation or
the S4 interpretations of classical in intuitionistic logic, or intutionistic logic in modal logic respectively. While
those translations provide a method to reinterpret the logical vocabulary – by keeping the non-logical vocabulary
fixed – in a provability-preserving way, recapture strategies typically show that, for a specific fragment of its
language, the non-classical theory behaves according to the rules of classical logic. For instance, that a non-
classical theory of truth behaves fully classically if one restricts her attention to the truth-free language. To carry
on with the analogy with the relationships between classical and intuitionistic logic, recapture strategies are much
closer to the identity between the ∆1-fragments of classical and intuitionistic arithmetic.
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(i) The following rules are admissible in extensions of G1hcd:
⇒ A,¬A Γ, A⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ¬A,∆
A,¬A⇒ Γ⇒ A,∆
Γ,¬A⇒ ∆
⇒ A,¬A Γ, A⇒ B,∆
Γ⇒ A→ B,∆
A,¬A⇒
¬A⇒ A→ ⊥
A,¬A⇒
A→ ⊥⇒ ¬A
⇒ A,¬A
A→ B ⇒ A ⊃ B
⇒ A,¬A
A ⊃ B ⇒ A→ B
(ii) The previous fact can be used to show, by an induction on rk(A), that ⇒ A,¬A is
derivable for any formula whenever ⇒ P,¬P is derivable for any atomic P in A.
Proof. We prove the claims for the crucial cases in which a conditional is involved:
For (i):
⇒ A,¬A
Γ⇒ A,¬A,B,∆
Γ, A⇒ B,∆
Γ, A⇒ ¬A,B,∆
Γ⇒ ¬A,B,∆
Γ⇒ B,¬A,A→ B,∆
B,A⇒ B
B ⇒ A→ B
Γ, B ⇒ ¬A,A→ B,∆
Γ⇒ ¬A,A→ B,∆
A,¬A⇒
A,¬A⇒ B
¬A⇒ A→ B
Γ,¬A⇒ A→ B,∆
Γ⇒ A→ B,∆
For (ii):
¬A,A⇒ B
¬A⇒ A→ B
¬(A→ B)⇒ A
B,A⇒ B
B ⇒ A→ B
¬(A→ B)⇒ ¬B
B,¬(A→ B)⇒
A→ B,¬(A→ B)⇒

Remark 1. The induction involved in Lemma 4(ii) does not go through in intuitionistic logic
with the HYPE-negation ¬ replaced by the intuitionistic negation.
Corollary 1. Let L be a language based on classical predicate symbols, i.e. for all P in L,
⇒ P (t),¬P (t) and P (t),¬P (t) ⇒ for all terms t, then for all formulas A of L, ⇒ A,¬A and
A,¬A⇒ are derivable.
3. Arithmetic in HYPE
We work with a suitable expansion of the usual signature {0, S,+,×} by finitely many function
symbols for selected primitive recursive functions suitable for a smooth representation of syntax
theory. We call this language L→
N
. We will also make use of the →-free fragment of the language
of arithmetic, which we label as LN. Our base theory will then be obtained by adding, to the basic
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axioms for 0, S,+,× (axioms Q1-2, Q4-7 of [HP93]), the recursive clauses for these additional
function symbols. The resulting system will be called HYA−.
In the following, the role of rule and axiom schemata will be crucial. It will be particularly
important to keep track of the classes of instances of a particular schema, and therefore we will
always relativize schemata to specific languages and understand the schema as the set of all its
instances in that language. For example, in the case of the induction axioms we use the label
IND→(L) to refer to the set of all sequents of the form
(IND→(L)) ⇒ A(0) ∧ ∀x(A(x)→ A(x + 1))→ ∀xA(x),
where A is a formula of L. Similarly, induction rules INDR(L) will refer to all rule instances
Γ, A(x)⇒ A(x + 1),∆
(INDR(L))
Γ, A(0)⇒ A(t),∆
for A a formula of L.
We call the extension of HYA− by the (unrestricted) induction rule HYA. We can easily see
that HYA is equivalent to Peano Arithmetic PA. This relies on the recapture properties of our
logic. Especially interesting is that, in HYA, we have a formulation of induction as a sequent,
which is equivalent to the rule formulation for formulas A containing only classical vocabulary.
By the properties stated in Lemma 4, we get:
Lemma 5. Let L ⊇ L→
N
. Over HYA−: INDR(L) and IND→(L) are equivalent when restricted to
formulas A such that ⇒ A,¬A.
Since for A ∈ L→
N
, ⇒ A,¬A and A,¬A ⇒ are derivable in G1hcd, we have the immediate
corollary that:
Corollary 2. HYA is equivalent to PA.
3.1. Ordinals and transfinite induction. Our notational conventions for schemata generalize
to schemata other than induction. A prominent role in the paper will be played by transfinite
induction schemata. In order to introduce them, we need to assume a notation system (OT,≺) for
ordinals up to the Feferman-Schütte ordinal Γ0 as it can be found, for instance, in [Poh09, Ch. 2].
OT is a primitive recursive set of ordinal codes and ≺ a primitive recursive relation on OT that
is isomorphic to the usual ordering of ordinals up to Γ0. We distinguish between fixed ordinal
codes, which we denote with α, β, γ . . ., and ζ, η, θ, ξ, . . . as abbreviations for variables ranging
over elements of OT. Our representation of ordinals satisfies all standard properties. In particular,
we will make implicit use of such properties that one can find in [TS00], p.322.
We will make extensive use of the following abbreviations. We call a formula progressive if it
is preserved upwards by the ordinals:
Prog(A) := ∀η(∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)→ A(η))
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This formulation is HYA-equivalent to a formulation as a sequent ∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ) ⇒ A(η). More-
over, if A(x) ∨ ¬A(x) is provable, then Prog(A) is HYA-equivalent to:
(1) ∀η(∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ) ⊃ A(η)).
Transfinite induction up to the ordinal α (≺ Γ0) will be formulated as the following rule:
Γ, ∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η),∆
TIα(A) :=
Γ⇒ ∀ξ ≺ αA(ξ),∆
TIα(L) is short for TIα(A) for every formulaA of the language L. TI<α(L) is short for TIβ(L) for
all β ≺ α.
We define recursively the function ωn: ω0 = 1, ωn+1 = ω
ωn .
3.2. Transfinite induction and non-classical predicates. Our main purpose in this paper
is to study the proof-theoretic properties of extensions of HYA with additional predicates that
may not behave classically – i.e. they may not satisfy Lemma 5. In fact, in the case of the pure
arithmetical language, Lemma 5 gives us immediately that HYA derives TI<ε0(L
→
N
). In this
section we show directly that Gentzen’s original proof of TI<ε0(L
→
N
) can be carried out in HYA
for suitable extensions of L→
N
.5
Theorem 1. Let L+ be a language expansion of L→
N
by finitely many predicate symbols. Then
HYA ⊢ TI<ε0(L
+).
The rest of this subsection will be devoted to the proof of Theorem 1, which will involve several
preliminary lemmata.
A key ingredient of Gentzen’s proof – which will also play an important role in subsequent
sections – is the Gentzen’s jump formula:
A+(θ) := ∀ξ(∀η(η ≺ ξ → A(η))→ ∀η(η ≺ ξ + ωθ → A(η)))
Lemma 6. For any A ∈ L+, if Prog(A) is derivable in HYA, then Prog(A+) is derivable in
HYA.
Proof. We want to show Prog(A+), i.e. ∀η(∀ζ ≺ η A+(ζ)→ A+(η)). Informally we make a case
distinction: Either θ = 0 or θ ≻ 0.
Case 1 : If θ = 0, then
(2) θ = 0, η ≺ ξ + ωθ ⇒ η ≺ ξ ∨ η = ξ.
Since Prog(A), we have
∀δ (δ ≺ ξ → A(δ)), η ≺ ξ ⇒ A(η)(3)
∀δ (δ ≺ ξ → A(δ)), η = ξ ⇒ A(η)(4)
5Troelstra & Schwichtenberg [TS00] established that the Gentzen proof can be carried out in the minimal → ∀⊥
fragment of IL.
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By (2) and Cut, we obtain
θ = 0, η ≺ ξ + ωθ ⇒ A(η).
Therefore, an application of (R →) and weakening yield
θ = 0⇒ ∀ζ ≺ η (A+(ζ))→ A+(η)
Case 2 : θ ≻ 0. Then by a derivable version of Cantor’s Normal Form Theorem:
(†) θ ≻ 0, η ≺ ξ + ωθ ⇒ ∃n ∃θ0 ≺ θ(η ≺ ξ + ω
θ0 · n).
By induction on n we will show that under the assumption ∀ζ ≺ θ A+(ζ)
θ0 ≺ θ ⇒ ∀η(η ≺ ξ + ω
θ0 · n→ A(η)).
The base case is straightforward because the following is trivially derivable (by property (ord6)):
(5) ∀η ≺ ξ A(η)⇒ (∀η ≺ ξ + ωθ0 · 0)A(η).
For the induction step, we start by noticing that we can derive the following,
(6) A+(θ0), ∀η ≺ ξ + ω
θ0 · nA(η)⇒ ∀η ≺ ξ + ωθ0 · (n+ 1)A(η)
which entails, since induction for ordinal notations up to ω is provable in PA,
(7) A+(θ0)⇒ ∀n∀η ≺ ξ + ω
θ0 · nA(η).
By cut and the definition of A+(θ0), from (7) we obtain:
(8) ∀η ≺ ξ A(η), ∀ζ ≺ θ A+(ζ), θ0 ≺ θ ⇒ ∀n∀η ≺ ξ + ω
θ0 · nA(η)
Therefore, the logical rules of HYPE give us:
(9) θ ≻ 0, ∀η ≺ ξ A(η), ∀ζ ≺ θ A+(ζ), ∃n ∃θ0 ≺ α(η ≺ ξ + ω
θ0 · n)⇒ A(η),
which in turn by (†) gives us:
(10) θ ≻ 0, ∀η ≺ ξ A(η), ∀ζ ≺ θ A+(ζ)⇒ ∀η ≺ ξ + ωθ A(η)
By applying the rule (R →) we finally get Prog(A+).

The progressiveness of Gentzen’s jump formula enables us then to establish:
Lemma 7. If TIα(L
+) is admissible in HYA, then TIωα(L
+) is admissible in HYA.6
Proof. What we want to show is, in fact, that if the following rule of transfinite induction is
admissible in HYA
Γ, ∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η),∆
TIα(A) := for any A ∈ L+
Γ⇒ ∀ξ ≺ αA(ξ),∆
6The notion of admissible rule that we employ is the one from [TS00, p. 76].
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then also the following rule is admissible in HYA:
Γ, ∀ζ ≺ η A(ζ)⇒ A(η),∆
TIωα(A) := for any A ∈ L+
Γ⇒ ∀ξ ≺ ωαA(ξ),∆
Thus, we assume that TIα(A) is admissible and Prog(A) is derivable for some arbitrary A ∈
L+. Then by our previous lemma Prog(A+) is also derivable. By assumption we have TIα(A)
for all A ∈ L+, especially for A+:
(11) ⇒ ∀β ≺ α(A+(β))
Therefore, by Prog (A+) and Cut:
(12) ⇒ ∀ξ(∀η ≺ ξ A(η)→ ∀η ≺ ξ + ωαA(η))
But also
(13) ⇒ ∀η ≺ 0A(η),
and therefore by (12), we obtain
⇒ ∀η ≺ ωαA(η)
as desired. 
Corollary 3. If A is such that HYA proves A(x) ∨ ¬A(x), we have that, if HYA proves the
classical transfinite induction axiom schema for α
(∀ζ ≺ ηA(ζ) ⊃ A(η)) ⊃ ∀ξ ≺ αA(ξ),
then HYA proves:
(∀ζ ≺ ηA(ζ) ⊃ A(η)) ⊃ ∀ξ ≺ ωαA(ξ).
All is set up to finally prove the main result of this section, the admissibility in HYA of the
required schema of transfinite induction up to any ordinal α ≺ ε0.
Proof of Theorem 1. The result follows immediately from the previous lemma. Since TIω0(A)
is trivially derivable in HYA, the lemma tells us that TIωn(A), for each n, can be reached in
finitely many proof steps.

4. Theory of Truth
In this section we introduce a theory of truth KFL. The theory is formulated in the language
L→
Tr
:= L→
N
∪ {Tr}, where Tr is a unary predicate for truth. KFL will be a theory of truth for
a →-free language LTr, which is simply the →-free fragment of L
→
Tr
. In KFL, the conditional
→ should be thought of as a theoretical device to formulate our semantic theory, and not as
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an object of the semantic investigation itself. Semantically (cf. §4.1), one should think of the
conditional as a device to navigate between fixed point models in the sense of [Kri75].
Definition 1 (The language LTr). The logical symbols of LTr are ⊥,¬,∨, ∀. In addition, we
have the identity symbol. Its non-logical vocabulary amounts to the arithmetical vocabulary of LN
and the truth predicate Tr.
Definition 2 (The theory KFL). KFL extends HYA formulated in L→
Tr
– i.e. with induction
rules extended to L→
Tr
– with the following truth initial sequents:
CtermLTr(x) ∧ CtermLTr(y)⇒ Tr(x=. y)↔ val(x) = val(y)(KFL1)
⇒ Tr(pTrx˙q)↔ Trx(KFL2)
SentLTr(x)⇒ Tr¬. x↔ ¬Trx(KFL3)
SentLTr(x) ∧ SentLTr(y)⇒ (Tr(x∧. y)↔ Tr(x) ∧ Tr(y))(KFL4)
SentLTr(x) ∧ SentLTr(y)⇒ (Tr(x∨. y)↔ Tr(x) ∨ Tr(y))(KFL5)
SentLTr(∀v. x) ∧ var(v)⇒ Tr(∀v. x)↔ ∀y(CTermLTr(y)→ Trx(y/v))(KFL6)
SentLTr(∀v. x) ∧ var(v)⇒ Tr(∃v. x)↔ ∃y(CTermLTr(y) ∧ Trx(y/v))(KFL7)
Trx⇒ SentLTr(x)(KFL8)
According to Lemma 4 we have that ⊥, ⊃ and→ obey the classical intro and elimination rules
when the antecedent is a formula of L→
N
.
Lemma 8. The following are provable in KFL:
(i) SentLTr(x)⇒ Tr p¬Tr x˙q↔ Tr¬. x
(ii) For A ∈ LTr, KFL ⊢ TrpAq↔ A.
4.1. Semantics. The intended interpretation of our theory of truth is based on Kripke’s fixed
point semantics [Kri75].7 The states of our model are going to be fixed-points of the usual
monotone operator associated with the four-valued evaluation schema as stated in Visser [Vis84]
and Woodruff [Woo84].
Let Φ: Pω → Pω be the operator defined in Halbach [Hal14] Lemma 15.6. We let
W := {X ⊆ ω | Φ(X) = X}(14)
S ≤W S
′ :⇔ S ⊆ S′(15)
S∗ = ω \ S, with X = {¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ X}(16)
TrS := S(17)
The intended full model MΦ is then the HYPE model based on the frame (W,≤W, ∗) with
the constant domain ω and the interpretation of the truth predicate at each state given by the
7The intended model presented here is based on the model presented in Leitgeb [Lei19, §7].
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extension of the corresponding fixed-point. The intended minimal model MminΦ is then given by
restricting the set of states to the minimal and maximal fixed points.
Lemma 9. If KFL ⊢ Γ⇒ ∆, then MΦ  Γ⇒ ∆.
4.2. Proof Theory: lower bound. We show that KFL can define (and therefore prove the
well-foundedness of) Tarskian truth predicates for any α ≺ ε0. By Feferman and Cantini’s
analyses of the proof theory of KF [Can89,Fef91], this entails that KFL can prove TI<ϕε00(LN).
We first define the Tarskian languages.
Definition 3. For 0 ≤ α < Γ0, we let:
SentLTr(0, x) :↔ SentLN(x)
SentLTr(ζ + 1, x) :↔ x = (s=. t)∨
(∃y ≤ x)(x = Tr. y ∧ SentLTr(ζ, y))∨
(∃y ≤ x)(x = (¬. y) ∧ SentLTr(ζ + 1, y))∨
(∃y∃z ≤ x)(x = (y∧. z) ∧ SentLTr(ζ + 1, y) ∧ SentLTr(ζ + 1, z))∨
(∃y∃z ≤ x)(x = (y∨. z) ∧ SentLTr(ζ + 1, y) ∧ SentLTr(ζ + 1, z))∨
(∃v∃y)(x = (∀v. y) ∧ SentLTr(ζ + 1, y))
SentLTr(λ, x) :↔ ∃ ζ < λSentLTr(ζ, x)
We then write:
Sent<αLTr (x) :↔ ∃ζ ≺ α SentLTr(ζ, x)
Trα(x) :↔ Sent
<α
LTr
(x) ∧ Tr(x).
As we mentioned, arithmetical vocabulary behaves classically in KFL.
Lemma 10. KFL ⊢ ∀x(SentLN(x)→ Trx ∨ Tr¬. x).
Proof. By formal induction on the complexity of the ‘sentence’ x ∈ LN. 
The next two claims establish that the previous fact can then be extended to all Tarskian
languages whose indices can be proved to be well-founded.
Lemma 11. KFL ⊢ (∀ζ ≺ η)(SentLTr(ζ, x)→ Trx ∨ Tr¬. x)⇒ SentLTr(η, x)→ Trx ∨ Tr¬. x.
Proof. Provably in KFL, η ∈ OT is either 0, or a successor ordinal, or a limit. By arguing
informally in KFL, we show that the statement of the lemma holds, thereby establishing the
claim. Lemma 10 gives us the base case. 
By Theorem 1, we obtain:
Corollary 4. For any α ≺ ε0, KFL ⊢ ∀x (SentLTr(α, x)→ Trx ∨ Tr¬. x).
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Since, by Theorem 1, KFL proves transfinite induction up to ordinals smaller than ε0, it
follows that we are able to climb up the Tarskian hierarchy of languages for iterations of the
truth predicate up to ε0. For α < Γ0, RT<α refers to the theory of ramified truth predicates up
to α, as defined in [Hal14, §9.1].
Corollary 5. KFL defines the truth predicates of RT<α, for α ≺ ε0. Therefore, KFL proves
TI<ϕε00(LN).
4.3. Proof Theory: upper bound. We interpret KFL in the Kripke-Feferman system KF.
For definiteness, we consider the version of KF formulated in a language LT,F featuring truth
(T) and falsity (F) predicates. Such a version of KF is basically the one presented in [Can89, §2],
but without the consistency axiom.
In order to interpret KFL into KF, we consider a two-layered translation that differentiates
between the external and internal structures of L→
Tr
-formulas. Essentially, the external transla-
tion fully commutes with negation, and translates the HYPE conditional as classical material
implication, whereas in the internal one we treat negated truth ascriptions as falsity ascriptions
and follow the positive inductive characterization. The internal translation therefore translates
truth and non-truth of KFL as truth and falsity of KF, respectively.
Definition 4. We define the translations τ : LTr → LT,F, and σ : L
→
Tr
→ LT,F as follows:
(i)
(s = t)τ = s = t (s 6= t)τ = s 6= t
(Trt)τ = Tτ(t) (¬Trt)τ = Fτ(t)
(¬¬ϕ)τ = (ϕ)τ
(ϕ ∧ ψ)τ = (ϕ)τ ∧ (ψ)τ (¬(ϕ ∧ ψ))τ = (¬ϕ)τ ∨ (¬ψ)τ
(∀vϕ)τ = ∀x(ϕ)τ (x/v) (¬(∀vϕ))τ = ∃x(¬ϕ)τ (x/v).
(ii)
(s = t)σ = s = t
(Trt)σ = T(t)τ (¬Trt)σ = F(t)τ
(¬ϕ)σ = ¬ϕσ
(ϕ ∧ ψ)σ = (ϕ)σ ∧ (ψ)σ (∀xϕ)σ = ∀xϕσ
(ϕ→ ψ)σ = ¬(ϕ)σ ∨ (ψ)σ
KFL-proofs can then be turned, by the translation σ, into KF-proofs, as the next proposition
shows.
Proposition 2. If KFL ⊢ Γ⇒ ∆, then KF ⊢ (
∧
Γ→
∨
∆)σ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the proof in KFL. We consider a few key
cases.
Nonclassical truth with classical strength. 15
(KFL3): we require that (with ≡ expressing material equivalence):
(18) KF ⊢ SentLTr ⇒ Tτ(¬. x) ≡ Fτ(x).
However, this can be proved by formal induction on the complexity of x. 
The combination of Proposition 2 and Corollary 5 yields that KF and KFL have the same
arithmetical theorems, and in particular they have the same proof-theoretic ordinal – cf. [Poh09,
§6.7].
Corollary 6. |KFL| = |KF| = ϕε00.
5. Schematic extension
5.1. KFL∗: rules and semantics. In this section we study the schematic extension of KFL
in the sense of [Fef91]. This is obtained by extending KFL with a special substitution rule
that enables us to uniformly replace the special predicate P in arithmetical theorems A(P ) of
our extended theory for arbitrary formulas of L→
Tr
. More precisely, following Feferman, we will
employ a schematic language L→
Tr
(P ) (and sub-languages theoreof) featuring a fresh schematic
predicate symbol P , which is assumed to behave classically.
Definition 5. The system KFL∗ in L→
Tr
(P ) extends KFL with
(i) ∀x(P (x) ∨ ¬P (x));
(ii) Disquotational axioms for P :
Tr(pP x˙q)⇒ P (x)(KFLP1)
P (x)⇒ Tr(pP x˙q)(KFLP2)
(iii) The substitution rule:
⇒ ∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) Γ(P )⇒ ∆(P )
for A in L→
Tr
(P ); Γ,∆ ⊆ L→
N
(P ).
Γ(A/P )⇒ ∆(A/P )
The semantics given in §4.1 can be modified to provide a class of fixed-point models forKFL∗.
We call ΦX the result of relativizing the operator from §4.1 to an arbitraryX ⊆ ω.
8 In particular,
this means supplementing the positive inductive definition associated with Φ with the clause:
a sentence Pz, with CtermLTr(z), is in the extension of the truth predicate (rel-
ativized to X) iff val(z) ∈ X .
This modification clearly does not compromise the monotonicity of the operator. Therefore, let
MINΦX be the minimal fixed point of ΦX , and MAXΦX its maximal one. For any X , we then
obtain the minimal HYPE model
MminΦX := ({MINΦX ,MAXΦX },⊆, ∗)
8Feferman [Fef91] provides a relativized fixed-point construction to arbitrary subsets of natural numbers and
establishes the soundness of KF∗.
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In MminΦX , all arithmetical vocabulary is interpreted standardly at the two states. Only the
interpretation of the truth predicate varies. Our notation reflects this.
Proposition 3. If KFL∗ ⊢ Γ⇒ ∆, then for all X, MminΦX  Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation in KFL∗.
We consider the case of the substitution rule applied to an arithmetical sequent Γ(P )⇒ ∆(P ).
That is, our proof ends with
⇒ ∀x(B(x) ∨ ¬B(x)) Γ(P )⇒ ∆(P )
Γ(B/P )⇒ ∆(B/P )
with B(x) an arbitrary formula of L→
Tr
.
By induction hypothesis, for all X , MminΦX  Γ(P ) ⇒ ∆(P ). Since Γ(P ) ⇒ ∆(P ) is arith-
metical, for all interpretations Y of P , (N, Y ) |= Γ(P )⇒ ∆(P ). Then, following [Fef91], we can
let:
Y = {n |MminΦX  Γ(B(n)/P )⇒ ∆(B(n)/P )}
to obtain that:
MminΦX  Γ(B/P )⇒ ∆(B/P ),
for any suitable X . 
5.2. Proof-theoretic analysis. We first consider the proof-theoretic lower-bound for KFL∗.
We adapt to the present setting the strategy outlined in [FS00, p. 84]. In particular, they
formalize a (relativized) A-Jump hierarchy, which is a hierarchy of sets obtained by iterating
an arithmetical operator expressed by an arithmetical formula A(X, θ, y). In particular, this
hierarchy is relativized to a set of natural numbers expressed by a predicate P . For our purposes,
it’s useful to formalize such a hierarchy by replacing membership in second-order parameters with
suitable truth ascriptions. In order to achieve this, we employ Feferman’s strategy in [Fef91] in
which the stages of the Turing jump-hierarchy are represented by means of suitable primitive
recursive functions on codes of LTr-formulas. Specifically, we encode in suitable PR functions
the stages of the A-Jump hierarchy. We denote with A(Trx(u˙), η, y) the result of replacing every
occurrence of u ∈ X with Tr sub(x, num(u)) in A(X, η, y). We let:
f0 := pPnq
fa(n) := p∃q(n0 = q ∧ q ≺ a ∧ Trf. qn1)q
fa(n) := pA(Trf
a, a, n)q
Ya(n) := Trfa(n)
An essential ingredient of the lower-bound proof for KFL∗ is the ‘disquotational’ behaviour
of our truth predicate for stages in the hierarchy that are provably well-founded.
Lemma 12. If we have TIα(LTr), then for all b, with 0 ≺ b ≺ α
Yb(n)↔ A(Trf
b, b, n).
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Proof. For all a and all n, we can show that Senta(f
a(n)) and Senta(fa(n))) by transfinite
induction on a making use of the properties of the ramified truth predicates such as, for λ ≺ α
limit:
∀b ≺ λ
(
Trλ(Trbt)↔ Trbval(t)
)
.

Another key component in the proof of the lower-bound for predicative system is Schütte’s
Veblen-jump formula [Sch77, p. 185]. One first defines the functions:
e(0) = 0 h(0) = 0
e(ωη) = η h(ωη) = 0
e(ωη1 + . . .+ ωηn) = ηn h(ω
η1 + . . .+ ωηn) = ωη1 + . . .+ ωηn−1
with ηn  . . .  η1. Recall that the Gentzen jump formula – with → the HYPE conditional –
is given by:
J (B, ξ) := ∀η(∀ζ ≺ η B(ζ)→ ∀ζ ≺ η + ξ B(ζ))
The more complex Veblen jump formula A on which we build our A-hierarchy:
A(Y, ξ, y) := ∀ζ(h(ξ) 4 ζ ≺ ξ J (Yζ , ϕ(e(ξ), y)))
We can then show an equivalent of Schütte’s Lemma 9 in [Sch77, p. 186], establishing the pro-
gressiveness of the stages of the A-hierarchy:
Lemma 13. If TI(α,L→
Tr
) is provable in KFL∗ for α < Γ0, then KFL
∗ proves:
∀ζ(0 ≺ ζ ≺ α ∧ (∀θ ≺ ζ Prog(Y Aθ )→ Prog(Y
A
ζ ))).
Proof. One first shows that the following claims
ζ ≺ t(19)
∀x ≺ ζ Prog(Y Ax )(20)
∀y ≺ η Y Aζ (y)(21)
∀y(l(y) < l(θ)→ (y ≺ ϕe(ζ)(η)→ (∀z(h(ζ) 4 z ≺ ζ → J (Y
A
z , y))))(22)
θ ≺ ϕe(a)(ζ)(23)
h(ζ)  ξ ≺ ζ(24)
entail J (Y Aξ , θ). By the principle of induction:
(25) ∀x(∀y(l(y) < l(x)→ φ(y))→ φ(x))→ φ(t)
applied to the formula
φ(y) :↔ y ≺ ϕe(ζ)η → ∀z(h(ζ) 4 z ≺ ζ J (Y
A
z , y)),
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we obtain
(26) ∀x ≺ ζ Prog(Y Ax )→ (∀y ≺ η Y
A
ζ (y)→ (θ  ϕe(ζ)η → ∀z(h(ζ) 4 z ≺ ζ J (Y
A
z , θ)))).
Using Lemma 6 and the properties of progressiveness we obtain:
(27) Prog(Y Aξ )→ (∀x ≺ ϕe(ζ)(η)J (Y
A
ξ , x)→ J (Y
A
ξ , ϕe(ζ)η)
Therefore,
(28) ∀x ≺ ζ Prog(Y Ax )→ ∀y ≺ η Y
A
ζ (y)→ ∀z(h(ζ) 4 z ≺ ζ J (Y
A
z , ϕe(ζ)η)),
However, by the definition of A,
(29) ∀x ≺ ζ Prog(Y Ax )→ ∀y ≺ η Y
A
ζ (y)→ A(Y
A, ζ, η).
Therefore, by Lemma 12,
(30) ∀x ≺ ζ Prog(Y Ax )→ ∀y ≺ η Y
A
ζ (y)→ Y
A
ζ (η).

Proposition 4. If TIγn(P ) is derivable in KFL
∗, then TIϕγn0(P ) is derivable in KFL
∗.
Proof. We assume Prog(P ). If TIγn(P ) is derivable in KFL
∗, then by Corollary 3 and the
determinateness of P we can show TIωγn+1(P ). By the substitution rule we get that the hierarchy
predicates are well-defined. Additionally we can prove that
(31) ∀ζ ≺ ωγn + 1 ∀x(Yζ(x) ∨ ¬Yζ(x))
Notice that by (31) we can reformulate this fragment of the hierarchy by replacing all the occur-
rences of the HYPE-conditional by the material conditional. Therefore, we have:
(32) ∀ζ ≺ ωγn + 1(Yζ(x)↔ A(f
ζ , ζ, x))
By the previous lemma, for a ≺ ωγn + 1,
(33) ∀b ≺ a Prog(Yb)→ Prog(Ya)
and therefore, by the substitution rule applied to TIγn(P ) and (33), that Prog(Yωγn ), which
entails Yωγn (0).
Using (32), we have:
(34) ∀ζ(h(ωγn)  ζ ≺ ωγn J (Yζ , ϕe(ωγn )0)
However, since h(ωγn) = 0 and e(ωγn) = γn we can then infer
(35) ∀ζ ≺ ωγn(∀y(∀x ≺ yYζ(x)→ ∀x ≺ y + ϕγn0 Yζ(x)))
By letting ζ = y = 0, we obtain ∀x ≺ ϕe(ωγn )0 P (x), as desired. 
Corollary 7. KFL∗ defines the truth predicates of RT<α, for α ≺ Γ0.
Nonclassical truth with classical strength. 19
Following the characterization of predicative analysis in terms of ramified systems given in
[Fef64,Fef91], and the relationships between ramified truth and ramified analysis studied there,
one can then conclude that the systems of ramified analysis below Γ0 are proof-theoretically
reducible to our system KFL∗.
The argument employed in the previous section to show that KFL can be proof-theoretically
reduced – w.r.t. arithmetical sentences – to KF can be lifted to KFL∗. One can consider the
system KF∗ – Ref∗(PA(P )) in [Fef91] –, and slightly modify the translations σ, τ from Definition
4: in particular, we let
(Ps)σ = (Ps)τ = Ps (¬Ps)τ = ¬Ps.
Then, by induction on the length of proof in KFL∗, we can prove:
Proposition 5. If KFL∗ ⊢ Γ⇒ ∆, then KF∗ ⊢ (
∧
Γ→
∨
∆)σ.
Given the analysis of KF∗ given in [Fef91], the combination of Propositions 5 and 4 yields a
sharp proof-theoretic analysis also for KFL∗:
Corollary 8. |KFL∗| = |KF∗| = Γ0.
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